COMMENTS
THE STATUS OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS:
EFFECT GIVEN "EQUAL TREATMENT"
STATUTES
THE CONSTITUTIONAL SETTING

of foreign corporation law reveals the effects of two
opposing theories rooted in divergent conceptions of the nature of
corporations. The restrictive theory emphasizes the high nature of
the act of sovereignty by which a corporate franchise is granted and
denies the existence of corporations beyond the boundaries of the creating jurisdiction. The liberal theory views the corporation as a normal
business instrumentality whose legal personality is no more than a
convenient mechanism of commerce and industry. Under this latter
conception, foreign corporations are accorded positions of approximate
equality with domestic corporations.'
In broad outline, foreign corporation law in America has evolved
gradually from the rigidity of the restrictive theory to the equality of
the liberal theory. The law's early development, however, was not the
result of a logically formulated theory of the extraterritorial status of
the corporation. - Corporations in colonial times were predominantly
expansive trading companies, identified with the grant of special privilege; monopoly, not legal personality, was their distinguishing feature.
The thought and language of the monopolistic period persisted in
the early nineteenth century, and incorporation by special act of the
legislature continued to be the practice. Changes brought about by an
extraordinary expansion of corporate activity, however, inveighed heavily against the restrictive theory,' and in 18o9 recognition of the rights
of corporations to sue in courts of states other than the state of incorporation 4 struck down a first principle of restrictivism, the nonrecognition of artificial personalities created by foreign sovereigns.
Nevertheless, the right of a corporation to transact business within
another state was asserted less successfully. In Bank of Aftgasta v.
Earle,5 Mr. Chief Justice Taney, grasping the logical completeness of
THE

HISTORY

1 Henderson, The Position of Foreign Corporationsin American Constitutional Law,
in 2 HARVARD STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE 3-6 (1918).

'd. at 34.

aId. at 36-37.

'Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 37 (8o9).
538 u.s. (13 Pet.) 443 (1839).
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restrictivism as a juristic conception, announced three closely reasoned
dicta that influenced the development of the law of foreign corporations
for at least a half century and, in some measure, continue to influence
related judicial thought to this day:
(i) The protection of the privileges and immunities clause of the
Constitution does not extend to foreign corporations;
(2) A corporation has no existence beyond the boundaries of the
creating state; and
(3) The state has unrestrained constitutional power to refuse recognition to a foreign corporation and to exclude it from transacting busi7
ness within its boundaries.
The effect of denying foreign corporations the protection of the
privileges and immunities clause is to permit a state to withhold from
foreign corporations those privileges that it confers on domestic corporations. To require that a state admit all foreign corporations doing a
particular business simply because it had chartered a similar domestic
corporation was unthinkable in this period in which corporations were
regarded with suspicion. For a state to be unable tolimit the number
of corporations doing business therein may today be an unacceptable
proposition. Thus, a corporation is not a "citizen" within the meaning
of the privileges and immunities clause.8 By separate constitutional
development, however, a foreign corporation may resort to local courts9
and engage in interstate and foreign commerce.' °
Taney's second dictum was a concession to the theory of the nonexistence of the corporation beyond the boundaries of the creating state.
The Court had adhered to this theory earlier in holding that jurisdiction
could be obtained over a corporation only in the state of incorporation."
The expansion of corporate activity required so restrictive a holding
to be circumvented, and thus the theories of "presence" and "implied
consent" evolved. A state in which a foreign corporation was "doing
business" could assume jurisdiction over the corporation by resorting
"id. at

502-13.

'Henderson, op. cit. supra note

i, at 48-49.
"For the observation that an argument can forcibly be made that the privileges and
immunities clause should not be wholly inapplicable to corporations and for a collection
of precedent to the contrary in spite of the argument's plausibility, see Holt, Fall Faith
and Credit-A Suggested Approach to the Problem of Recognition of Foreign Corporations, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 453, 454 (9+0)
9 Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 37 (18o9).

0 23 AM. JUR. Foreign Corporations § 39 (1939)"

Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (

3

Pet.) 443 (1839).
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to these theories and still do no violence to existing notions of due
process. These tests of jurisdiction have in turn been replaced, and12
the substituted approach is the "fairness" or "minimum contacts" test.
Thus, the dictum that corporations do not exist beyond the boundaries
of the creating state has run its course, but not without significantly
affecting the development of foreign corporation law.
The third of Taney's important dicta was that a state has unrestrained constitutional power to refuse recognition to a foreign corporation and to exclude it from transacting business within the state's
boundaries. Even after the adoption of the fourteenth amendment,
many decisions dogmatically expounded this essence of restrictive theory.
As late as I9o611 the Supreme Court was stating restrictivism in its most
drastic form: A state might decline to admit a foreign corporation
arbitrarily or for a motive quite contrary to the general purpose of the
Constitution; a state might admit a corporation on conditions that result
in discrimination between it and domestic corporations, and even between
it and corporations of other states; and a state might admit a corporation on one set of conditions and then, without cause, impose a more
burdensome set.14
In a series of decisions beginning in I9ro,15 the Supreme Court imposed three important qualifications upon state powers of exclusion and
expulsion, amounting to almost complete repudiation of restrictivism:
(i) The admission of a foreign corporation cannot be subject to
"unconstitutional conditions";
(2) A foreign corporation, as a person, is to be protected against
arbitrary expulsion by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendmenti and
(3) A foreign corporation is entitled to equality of treatment with
domestic corporations under the fourth clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Thus, the states may not employ their broad powers over foreign
corporations to attain unconstitutional ends. Limitations upon state
2

" Note, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations: The North Carolina Statute, z959

L.J. 644, 645 n.5. The note, generally, reviews three North Carolina Supreme
Court decisions respecting the application of North Carolina's innovating statutory provision, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145(a)(3) (x96o), extending the jurisdiction of its
courts over foreign corporations in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (x945).
"National Council U.A.M. v. State Council, 203 U.S. 151 (z9o6).
DUKE

"Henderson, op. cit. supra note z,at zio-ii.
5Id. at xx.
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power to impose conditions, to regulate and to expel are now recognized as inherent in the boundaries of state jurisdictional authority, in

the provisions of state and federal constitutions and in principles of
natural law.

What remains of the power to exclude may yet vanish

with a complete recognition of the states' full faith and credit obligation."0 In substance, this is the current constitutional setting of foreign
corporation law.
THE "EQUAL TREATMENT" PROVISIONS

In the gradual evolution of foreign corporation theory from the
extremely restrictive to the liberal, there emerged in more than half
the states constitutional and statutory provisions which, while varying
in wording, explicitly or inferentially make state corporation law applicable to foreign corporations." The Illinois statute, which is sufficiently representative, has language that is unambiguous on its face.'
A
Holt, supra note 8, at 480.
Those provisions in which the legislature has expressly granted pure equal
ment are: ALASKA COMp. LAWS ANN. § 3 6-zA-14z (Supp. 1958) ; COLO. REv.
ANN. § 31-10-2 (Supp. 1957); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-933 (Supp. 1957); FLA.
ANN. § 613.02 (1956); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 174-8 (i955); IDAHO CODE
§ 3o-51o (1948); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.103 (Smith-Hurd i954);
"

CODE ANN. § 494.14 (1949) 5 LA. REv. STAT.

§

450.94

§
§

5341

(Supp. 1956); MINN. STAT. ANN.

§

treatSTAT.
STAT.
ANN.
IOWA

12:203 (1950); MIcH. COMP.LAWS

§

303.09 (1947) 5 Miss. CODE ANN.
STAT. § 351.575 (1952)5 MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
15-1709 (1955)
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-1O-1 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-132
(1960); N.D. REV. CODE § 10-2207 (Supp. 1957); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.18,
§ 1.199 (1953)i ORE. REV. STAT. § 57.660 (Supp. 1959)5 PA. STAT. ANN. tit.15,
§ 2852-909 (1958)i S.D. CODE § 11-Z101 (1939) TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-907
(1955) 5 TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.ANN.art. 1532 (1945); W. VA.CODE ANN.§ 3091[79]
(19SS); WIs. STAT. § 180.807 (19S7).
In other states the legislative expression has
taken the form of substantial equal treatment as seen through the following: ARIz. REV.

('957)5
MO. ANN.

STAT. ANN. § 10-484 (1956); ARK. CONST. art. 12, § ii;

CAL. CONST. art. 12, § is;

GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1502 (1936); IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-302 (1948); KAN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-505 (1949); KY. CONST. § 202; ME.REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 53, § 129
(1954) i MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 88 (i957) 5 MASS.ANN. LAWS ch. 181, § 2 (1955)5
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1703.15 (Page 1954); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 7-2-26
(1956); S.C. CODE § 12-701 (1952)5 UTAH CONST. art. 12, § 6; VT. STAT. ANN.
tit.
I', § 762 (1958); VA. CONST. art. 12, § 163; WASH. CONST. art. .2, § 7. States

lacking definite legislative expression are Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Wyoming. Some of the lastmentioned states rest their treatment of foreign corporations on a system of comity,
exemplified by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:15-5 (1939). For judicial policy favoring equal
treatment in the absence of any legislative expression, see German-American Coffee Co.
;v.Diel, z6 N.Y. 57, 109 N.E. 875 (1915)" "No foreign corporation shall transact in this State any business which a corporation organized under the laws of this State is not permitted to transact. 4 Foreign
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foreign corporation "shall... enjoy the same.., rights and privileges
as a domestic corporation" and "shall be subject to the same duties, restrictions, penalties, and liabilities."'" To the extent that provisions in
other jurisdictions are less specific, liberal constructions, perhaps even
strained interpretations, may be necessary if local corporation law is to be
similarly applied.20 But, whether the legislature has expressed itself
specifically or subtly, equality of treatment is unquestionably its purpose.
An examination of the judicial effect given these equal treatment provisions in several pronounced areas of corporate affairs will illuminate
the practical status of the foreign corporation under the law.
TAXATION

Insofar as a foreign corporation is engaged in interstate or foreign
commerce or is incorporated by the federal government, it has the rigfit
to pursue business in a jurisdiction other than that of its origin. Within
the constitutional limits outlined above, 2 ' however, a state may prescribe
the terms upon which foreign corporations not similarly engaged may be
admitted to do business. Accordingly, a state may require the payment
of arbitrary fees, or it may at stated intervals exact "graduated privilege
taxes" based upon the amount of business transacted within the state. corporationwhich shall have received a certificate of authority under this Act shall, until

a certificate of revocation or of withdrawal shall have been issued as provided in this
Act, enjoy the same, but no greater, rights and privileges as a domestic corporation
organized for the purposes set forth in the application pursuant to which such certificate
of authority is issued; and, except as in this Act otherwise provided, shall be subject
to the same duties, restrictions, penalties, and liabilities now or hereafter imposed upon
a domestic corporation of like character." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.103 (SmithHurd 1954). (Emphasis added.)

"9The Illinois Supreme Court has construed this provision in the following language:
"While the act does not declare foreign corporations complying with its terms to be domestic corporations nor purport to adopt the foreign corporations, it does clothe foreign
corporations with the same powers, rights, and privileges and imposes upon them the
same liabilities and duties as domestic corporations. There is essentially no difference
between the foreign and domestic corporation. The intention was to obliterate any distinction in the treatment of domestic corporations and foreign corporations which had
complied with the act. The effect was to give the foreign corporation the same standing
in the eye of the law as the domestic corporation, giving it th&same rights and subjecting
it to the same remedies." Charles Friend & Co. v. Goldsmith & Seidel Co., 307 Ill. 45P
53-54, 138 N.E. 185, 188 (1923).

See AM. JuR. Foreign Coiporations § 314 n.tg

(1939).
"'Latty, Pseuido-Foreign Corporations,65 YALE L.J. 137, 157 (1955).

2' But see Holt, supra note 8, for the requirements a recognition of the states' full
faith and credit obligation would impose.
"'State ex rel. Davenport v. International Harvester Co., 2z6 Ind. 463, 469, Z5
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The Supreme Court has held that when a corporation is granted permission to enter a state having an equal treatment provision, the corporation acquires a contractual right to do business in that state.'
Any

financial conditions imposed by the state become elements of this contract. However, the corporation is subject to no greater liabilities
than were contemporaneously or may be subsequently imposed upon
domestic corporations.24 Thus, although the corporation may be required to bear its proportionate share of the burdens of government,

these burdens are to be imposed without discrimination. 5
An examination of state taxation policy reveals that the incidence

of taxes on domestic corporations will extend, within constitutional
limits, to foreign corporations.

For example, an ad valorem tax is im-

posed indiscriminately on the property of both domestic and foreign
corporations. 6 In order to impose on domestic corporations engaged in
both interstate and intrastate commerce the same state income tax that

is imposed on similarly engaged foreign corporations, some jurisdictions2 7 have limited the base of the tax to that portion of income derived
from interstate commerce attributable to business done in the state,
although they have the power to tax the entire net income of a domestic
corporation from whatever source derived.2
N.E.2d
(1926).

242,

"The

245

(1940) i accord, Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494

statute amounts to a contract with complying foreign corporations that they

will not be subjected during the period for which they are admitted to greater liabilities
than those imposed on domestic corporations, and subsequent statutes imposing higher
annual license fees on foreign corporations for the privilege of continuing to do business
are void as impairing the obligation of such contract. American Smelting & Ref. Co.
v. Colorado ex rel. Lindsley, 2o4. U.S. 103 (1907)
accord, American Can Co. v.
Emmerson, 288 Ill. 289, 123 N.E. 581 (1919). This rationale was not followed, how-

ever, and equal treatment was denied in British-American Mortgage Co. v. Jones, 77
S.C. 44-3, 58 S.E. 417 (1907), where it was held that each year the license of the
foreign corporation expired and was renewed only by the payment of the annual license
fee. Thus, the contract with the state for equal treatment was limited to one year, and
accordingly, additional conditions could be perennially imposed.
"23 AM. JUR. Foreign Corporations § 322 (1939).
"2State ex rel. Davenport v. International Harvester Co., 216 Ind. 463, 469, 25
N.E.zd 242, 245 (1940).

"McDaniel

v. Texarkana Cooperage & Mfg. Co., 94 Ark. 235, t26 S.W. 727

Accord, Gray v. Central Fla. Lumber Co., 104 Fla. 446, 140 So. 320, cert.
denied, 287 U.S. 634 (1932).
2T E.g., Matson Nay. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 3 Cal.zd I, 43 P.2d 805
(1935) , aff'd, 297 U.S. 441 (1936). Thus, equal treatment is still the effect, although
the legislative concern is clearly with the domestic corporation.
21 For possible exceptions to this power to tax, see Lynch v. New York
ex rel.
Pierson, 293 U.S. 52 0934).
(191o).
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The cases indicate that courts have made a studied effort to treat
foreign and domestic corporations on the planes of equality set by the
legislatures. When a licensing fee has been exacted in different terms
for the two classes of corporations, courts, for constitutional reasons,2
have made certain that the legislation results in equality of treatment
and is "in substance and effect" the same for both classes.30
In spite of the elementary equal treatment proposition, instances
bf judicial discrimination in taxation have been glaring. These have
rIesulted from both unjustified classification and undeserved exemption.
For example, a Minnesota statute grants properly licensed foreign
corporations the same rights and privileges enjoyed by domestic corporations. Nevertheless, a foreign corporation must procure the twohundred-dollar "fur buyer's license" prescribed for nonresidents, rather
than the five-dollar license for residents.31 Even though the nonresident
corporation is duly licensed in the state, the Minnesota court held that
its status as a "nonresident corporation" does not change. The equal
treatment statute does not grant foreign corporations "immunity from
licensing or taxation on a basis or classification different from that
applied to domestic corporations in cases where the fact of residence or
nonresidence is a valid distinguishing element of the classification," and
fur-buying, which would seem quite apart from wildlife-taking, the
regulation of which is admittedly within the police power, is such a case.
Nor does this result make the licensing act "inconsistent with" the
corporation act, which, the court broadly describes, "is designed to protect society's dealings with businesses conducted in corporate form."
32
The design of the equal treatment statute is conveniently lost.
A second instance of discrimination involved a charitable foreign
corporation that was denied an exemption from a local inheritance tax,
although if it had been a domestic corporation, "there could be no doubt
as to its right of exemption." Notwithstanding statutory provision that
foreign corporations shall have the same rights and privileges as domestic corporations, the Illinois court stated that "the rule of construction accepted by this court is that an act of the legislature granting
powers, privileges, or immunities to corporations must be held to apply
only to corporations created under the authority of this state, and over
'Great W. Sugar Co. v. Mitchell, 1x9 Mont. 328, 338, 174. P.2d 817, 822 (t946).
"American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Colorado ex tel. Lindsley, 204 U.S. 103 (1907).
3State ex rel. Ohsman & Sons Co. v. Starkweather, 214. Minn. 232, 7 N.W.2d
747 (1943).
"I1d. at 237, 7 N.W.zd at 749.
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which this state has the power of visitation and control, unless the
intent that the act shall apply to other than domestic corporations is
33
plainly expressed in the terms of the act."

In the Minnesota case the label "nonresident" permitted the exaction
from the foreign corporation of a licensing fee forty times greater than
the fee required of domestic corporations; in the Illinois case "strict
construction" of the exemption provisions of a tax statute resulted in the
taxation of an admittedly charitable, but still foreign, corporation. These
results, again, were sanctioned by courts that were aware of the equal
treatment statutes but insufficiently constrained to follow them when
'matters of state revenue were in question.
LEGAL ACTIoNs

Apart from specific questions of jurisdiction involving attachment,
service of process and venue, the general proposition is that a corporation that complies with the state's statutory requirements has the right
3
to sue or defend in a jurisdiction other than that of its origin. " In the
face of equal treatment provisions, absent positive statutory qualification,
35
this right of access which rests on the comity of states should, as with
domestic corporations, be absolute.
A. Amenability to Attachment and Process
Courts that are conscious of equal treatment requirements have
generally adhered to the principle that foreign corporations are to be
subject to suit in the same manner that .is prescribed for suits against
domestic corporations of like character. 6 A foreign corporation is
subject to the same liabilities as domestic corporations and is, therefore,
subject to suit in that state. This is true even though the corporation is
3
not required to designate an agent upon whom process could be served.
A foreign corporation that has agents in a state, who are authorized
8s
and designated by statute to receive service, must be sued in personam;
"' People v. Woman's Home Missionary Soe'y, 303 Ill. -418, 420-21, 135 N.E. 749,
750 (1922).

"Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (s Cranch) 37 (18o9) 5 accord, Heart
of America Ins. Agency v. Wichita Cab & Transp. Co., 151 Kan. 420, 99 P.2d 765
(1940).

a

3 AM. JUR. Foreign Corporations § 484 (x939); Taylor v. Toledo Trust Co.,
o

ix 9 Fla. 9 , 16o So.

366 (-935).

(1915).
1o
"7International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers v. Tennessee Copper Co,.,
F. Supp. xots (E.D. Tenn. 1940).
" While the foreign corporation is not a resident of the state, suit must be co~imenced

"Jennings v. Idaho Ry., Light & Power Co., 26 Idaho 703,'146 Pac.

3

DUKE LIW JOURNdL

[Vol. i96t: 274

its property, like that of domestic corporations, cannot be attached."0
Likewise, a creditor's failure to attach corporate property is not available
to a foreign corporation as a defense. 40 This is, of course, conformable
with the rule of federal jurisdiction that a foreign corporation is regarded
41
as a citizen or resident of the state of its incorporation.
Statutes that confer greater rights on foreign corporations than on
domestic corporations are carefully scrutinized by the courts and, in instances, invalidated for want of due process. Thus, it is unconstitutional
'to provide for service of process upon the secretary of state for domestic
corporations that have not designated agents to receive service when
foreign corporations can be served through a state official only upon
affidavit and court order.12 Such discrimination is as incompatible with
the requirements of equal treatment as it is offensive to notions of due
process.
B. Propriety of Local Venue
In states that give equal treatment, absent qualifying statutory provisions, it is not enough that venue statutes do not unreasonably discriminate against foreign corporations, 4 3 although this may satisfy a
circumscriptive fourteenth amendment. For purposes of venue, foreign
corporations permitted to exercise corporate functions within the state
must be treated as domestic corporations. This principle has received
consistent recognition. Complying corporations have been held to
have acquired both the right to sue and to be sued in the courts of a
state. 44 One state, 45 however, which at first gave equal treatment by
denying to a domestic corporation a change of venue in view of a prior
by personal service upon its agents.

S.W.2d 679 (-939).

Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Bounds, x98 Ark. 149, 127

"Burgin Bros. & McCane v. Barker Baking Co.,

52 La. o75, 95 So. 227

(1922);

Charles Friend & Co. v. Goldsmith & Seidel Co., 307 IIL 45, 138 N.E. 18s (1923).
"Palmer v. Avalon Oil Co., io La. App. 512, xo So. 781 (.9,9).
41 72 Stat. 415, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1958).
See generally 23 A . JUR. Foreign
Corporatins§ 502 (-939).
"Bruhnke v. Golden W. Wineries Inc., 56 Cal. App. 7d Supp. 943, x3z P.2d xo±
,.1942).
"An example is the statute that makes foreign corporaions subject to suit in any
county in the state, while providing that domestic corporations shall be sued only in the
counties where they are found, or do business or have a representative. See 23 AM. JUR.
Foreign Corporations § 503 n.5 (5939).
"'Smith-Douglass Co. v. Honeycutt, 2o4 N.C. 59i, 167 S.E. 81o (1933); accord,
John P. Nutt Corp. v. Southern Ry., 214 N.C. 19, t 9 7.S.E. 534 (x938), and Hill v.
Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 229 N.C. 728, 51 S.E.2d x83 (.949).
"'Smith v. Inter-Mountain Auto. Co., 25 Idaho 2%z, 136 Pac. 1125 (19-3).
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46

holding that foreign corporations acquired no fixed residence, later
refused to extend subsequently enacted venue provisions respecting
domestic corporations to a foreign corporation.4'
C. Pleading the Statute of Limitations
Although a few courts have held that a foreign corporation cannot
48
plead the statute of limitations as a defense in actions against it, general
practice allows the defense if the corporation may be served with process
in the forum state.49 Compliance by a foreign corporation with constitutional or statutory requirements will start the statute of limitations
running against it, as well as in its favor. ° In brief, the statute of limitations is no exception to the statutes applicable to a complying corporation.
CORPOR.ATION FINANCE

A. Issuance of Stock

The issuance of stock by a corporation, like the election of officers,' 1
the payment of dividends, 2 the inspection of booksP- and the naming of
the corporation, 4 is regarded as involving the internal affairs of the
corporation over which, as a general rule, courts of a nonincorporating

state will not assume jurisdiction.5" Although in isolated instances state
courts have exercised 50 jurisdiction over foreign corporations to compel
the issuance of stock, in construing, in the light of equal treatment requirements, a statute that makes no express distinction between foreign
and domestic corporations,"7 these cases have been rejected as authority
"'Boyer v. Northern Pac. Ry., 8 Idaho 74, 66 Pac. 826 (o901).
"American Sur. Co. v. District Court, 43 Idaho 589, 254 Pac. 515 (1927).
' The rule adopted to sanction this result is that a foreign cbrporation is deemed to
come within saving clauses of statutes of limitation relative to persons absent from the
state.
,'Weishaar v. Butters Pump & Equip. Co., 149 Kan. 842, 89 P.2d 864 (1939).
See 23 Am. JUtR. Foreign Corporations § 562 (1939).
0
" American Sur. Co. v. Blake, 4.5 Idaho 159, 261 Pac. 239 (-927).
51 13 Aii. JUR. Foreign Corporations § 431 (1939).
52 23 AM. JuiLJ Foreign Corporations § 434 (1939).
53 23 AM. JUR. Foreign Corporations § 435 (1939).
"Red Seal Ref. Co. v. Red Seal Ref. Coip., xiS Okla. 63, 2z4 Pac. 76z (1925);
State ex rel. Equitable Sec. Corp. v. Conway, 189 La. 272, 179 So. 312 (938).
a 23 AM. Jus. Foreign Corporations § 424 (939).
56 The term "exercised" is used, since considerations are of policy and propriety
rather than of power.
'7 In Guilford v. Western Uniofi Tel. Co., 59 Minn. 332, 61 N.W. 324 (.894-),
jurisdiction was exercised to compel the issuance of stock to a Minnesota citizen in lieu
of a pre-existing certificate which had been lost.
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that a foreign corporation can issue capital stock outside the state of its
incorporation."' Courts recognize that the term "internal affairs" is
more or less indefinite, but as to whether the issuance of stock by a
corporation may be so designated, they confront no problem. "From
the very nature of corporate stock, which is created by and under the
authority of a state, the right or duty to issue it, like the other attributes
of the corporation, is governed by the local laws of the state from which
it derives its existence, and not by that of any other state.""0 The excepting label "internal affairs" represents a body of law too substantial
and a policy so acceptable that contrary results, even in the face of the
literal requirements of equal treatment, cannot be expected.0 0
B. Restrictions on Investments
In equal treatment states, local statutes regulating investments that
may be held by certain domestic corporations should apply to foreign
corporations of like character. A conveyance of real estate to a foreign
corporation organized for educational or benevolent purposes, therefore,
has not been presumed to be against state policy if similar domestic
corporations are allowed to take title to real estate."' On the other
hand, an investment by a foreign corporation that constituted the controlling interest in a competing domestic corporation has been disallowed as contrary to the state's policy against monopolies. 2 Although
courts have consistently given equal treatment in this area, harsh results
have been worked, as where a foreign corporation expressly licensed to
do a general brokerage and commission business was subsequently and,
for all purposes, permanently preduded from buying, selling or dealing in corporate securities on the sole ground that domestic corporations
were not authorized to hold stock in other corporations.3
C. Corporate Claims
Since equal treatment statutes do not permit foreign corporations
to transact business denied to domestic corporations, it follows that
foreign corporations cannot be accorded greater privileges than domestic
"sSouthern Sierras Power Co. v. Railroad Comm'n,

205

Cal. 479,

271

Pac. 747

(1928).

"9 1d. at 483, 271 Pac. at 748-49.
" Fox-Woodsum Lumber Co. v. Bank of America Natl Trust & Say. Ass'n, 7 Cal.2d
I4, 59 P.2d oi9 (936).
a% 23 AM. JuR. Foreign Corporations § 173 (1939).
- 2 Dunbar v. American Tel.'& Tel. Co., 238 Ill. 456, 87 N.E.
eGolden v. Cervenka, 278 Ill. 409, xx6 N.E. 273 (5957).

521 (1909).

Vol.

9961: 274]

EQUAL TREATMENT STATUTES

285

corporations in making contracts within an equal treatment state.6 4 Thus,
foreign corporations have been subject to the defense of usury when
asserted by resident defendants, even though the contract rate of interest
was usurious only in the resident's state and not in the state of incorporation.6 5 Equal treatment has been applied in the reverse situation
where the foreign corporation has been permitted to raise the defense

of usury, even though it could not have done so in the state of its incorporation. 6
EMINENT DOMAIN

The question whether the right of eminent domain extends to
foreign corporations under equal treatment statutes that do not expressly
reserve or authorize its exercise6 7 has rarely been considered. In one

instance, a foreign corporation without the power to condemn in the
state of its origin was extended condemnation rights under a local law
made applicable by equal treatment, thus securing rights of domestic
corporations to a foreign corporation otherwise limited by charter.Ys
In another, a foreign corporation was permitted to exercise the right of
eminent domain, although a dissenting judge, taking an extreme position
in the face of dearly manifested legislative intent, would have required
an express grant of the right of eminent domain to foreign corporations. 9 Dearth of precedent permits but an inconclusive appraisal of
judicial attitude toward equal treatment in this area. Still, courts that
"&Union Say. Ass'n v. Cummins, 78 Okla. z65, i9o Pac. 869 (192o).

Discriminatory

laws have been held to have been repealed by implication with the adoption of equal
treatment provisions. Crenshaw v. Texokola Pecan Shellers, Inc., 171 Tenn. 273, 102
S.W.2d 6o (1937).
05
Mirgon v. Sherk, 196 Wash. 690, 84 P.zd 362 (1938).
6
6E. C. Warner Co. v. W. B. Foshay Co., 57 F.zd 656 (8th Cir. 1932). Courts
have also construed equal treatment as permitting rules concerning the admissibility
of custom and usage to be applicable in a suit on a contract claim, even though the
plaintiff-assignee was a foreign corporation having no knowledge of local custom. Park
Nat'l Bank v. Goolsby, i79 Tenn. 194, T64 S.W.2d 545 (942).

67Five equal treatment statutes expressly authorize foreign corporations to exercise

rights of eminent domain: IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-510 (1948); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 494.11 (1949)i MONT. REv. CODEs ANN. § 15-17o8 (i955)5 UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 16-8-4 (953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 'I, § 762 (1958) (limited to foreign public
service corporations). One state gives equal treatment only as to eminent domain:
Another, while giving equal treatment, exALA. CODE ANN. tit. to, § 189 (1940).
pressly reserves the "power to condemn or appropriate private property": ARK. CONST.
art. 12, § 11.
6"Southern Power Co. v. Walker, 89 S.C. 84, 71 S.E. 356 (5911).
"'Southern Ill. & Mo. Bridge Co. v. Stone, 174 Mo. 1, 73 S.W. 4-53 (-903).
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have considered the question are conscious of the fact that according
foreign corporations local rights of eminent domain encourages the economic development of the state.
EQUAL TREATMENT STATUTES AND THE PSEUDo-FOREIGN CORPORATION:
CONCLUSION

Finally, this survey of the judicial effect given equal treatment
statutes reveals the difficulty courts have encountered, not only in differentiating between foreign corporations and pseudo-foreign corporations,
but also in determining the extent to which local corporation law is
applicable once the two have been differentiated.70 The problems suggesting exploration are presented in the example in which state A denies
corporate indemnification of a director adjudged liable for negligence.
Assuming state B allows indemnification, the question arises as to whether
the nominal state B corporation doing its principal business in state A
can indemnify its directors. Should state A deny indemnification because the "internal affairs" of a state B corporation are involved, 71 or
should it pierce the foreign incorporation procedure and decide the question in accordance with local [state A] law? 2
The law of foreign corporations has evolved from the rigidity
of
restrictivism to the equality of a liberalism that has found legislative
expression in over half the states. The judicial effect that has been
given these equal treatment provisions has been examined in decisions
in significant areas of corporate affairs. Regrettably, little basis has
been uncovered for the resolution of the problems presented by the
pseudo-foreign corporation in American corporate law. Further understanding of the meaning of equal treatment, especially as it is revealed
by judicial application, should clarify the legal status of the foreign
corporation.
" An examination of the whole question of the application of local law to corporations essentially local in character but incorporated in a foreign state, prompted by a
recent attempt at legislation specially subjecting pseudo-foreign corporations to certain
provisions of local corporation law, appears in Latty, supra note 20.
"Cf. Home Inv. Co. v. Fidelity Petroleum Co., 249 S.W. 1109 (Tex. Civ. App.
1923).

"'Cf.Tokian Royalty Corp. v. Tiffany, 193 Okla.

12o, 141

P.2d 57' (1943).

